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Structuring an Effective Occupational
Disease Policy: Victim Compensation and
Risk Regulation
W. Kip Viscusit
Controlling occupational disease is now at the forefront of the debate
over occupational health and safety. Although workplace injuries have re-
ceived attention from labor, government, and insurance officials for many
years, the general public has only recently become aware of the magnitude
of the occupational disease problem. The surge in asbestos-related diseases
has fostered greater public awareness and concern about the issue,' as has
the recent Johns-Manville bankruptcy."
This Article analyzes the current approaches to the occupational disease
problem, and proposes a new strategy for responding to the problem. Sec-
tion I of this Article describes the dimensions of the occupational disease
problem. Sections II and III then discuss the inability of market forces,
direct regulation, workers' compensation, products liability lawsuits, and
proposed legislation to solve this problem. Section IV presents guidelines
for reformulating our occupational disease policy and outlines a proposal
implementing these guidelines.
Three key principles emerge from the analysis. First, compensation
plans should be coordinated with direct regulation of workplace risk be-
cause both influence employers' decisions affecting workplace health con-
ditions. Second, compensation plans should provide similar levels of in-
come support to similarly situated victims. Third, occupational disease
policy should clearly distinguish between diseases that have already been
contracted and those that will be contracted in the future. Implementation
of these principles would be an important step toward achieving the dual
goals of fair compensation and efficient health risk levels.
t Professor and Director, Center for Study of Business Regulation, Fuqua School of Business,
Duke University. This article is an outgrowth of a report on toxic tort compensation policies prepared
for the Office of Management and Budget. Thomas Hopkins, Thomas Lenard, Michael Mazur, John
Morrall, and Frederic Siskind provided helpful comments.
1. See generally P. BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERICANS (1974) (an early exposi of asbestos
hazards).
2. In re Johns-Manville Corp., Nos. 82B 11,656-676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982). See
Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter II Proceedings, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1121 (1983).
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I. The Occupational Disease Problem
Occupational disease is a problem of staggering proportions, both in its
effects on workers and on industry. Approximately 162,000 occupational
illnesses are documented each year by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.'
These figures probably understate the disease problem,' however, since
other Department of Labor statistics indicate that there are now two mil-
lion people severely or partially disabled by occupational disease, of whom
700,000 suffer long-term total disability.' Other estimates indicate that
there are currently 85,000 victims of asbestos-related diseases alone.6
Several factors make it difficult to estimate precisely the scope of the
occupational disease problem. In part, it is impossible to know the exact
number of disease victims because some occupational illnesses have long
latency periods (i.e., their symptoms do not appear until many years after
the exposure to the hazard). In instances where disease victims can be
identified, it may be difficult or impossible to ascertain the cause or causes
of their diseases. Although well-defined scientific relationships exist in
some instances,7 most diseases may be caused by exposure to any one of
several substances, or by participation in any one of several activities.
Lung cancer, for example, may be attributed to inhalation of cigarette
smoke, asbestos, or numerous other carcinogens.8 Thus, it may be quite
difficult to determine whether someone's disease is the result of occupa-
tional hazards.
Whatever the precise scope of the problem, any occupational disease
compensation plan will have important financial effects on various indus-
tries. During the past decade, for example, workers have filed numerous
3. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED
STATES BY INDUSTRY, 1981, BLS BULLETIN 2164 (1983). The shortcomings of these data collection
methods are discussed in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPA-
TIONAL DISEASES 39-40 (1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT].
4. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 39. The Bureau of Labor Statistics bases its statistics on
employers' reports to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on workplace ail-
ments. These reports may miss chronic illnesses caused by workplace exposures if the illness appears
after the worker has changed jobs. Id. at 39.
5. Id. at 2.
6. See Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1982, at 7, col. 2.
7. Mesothelioma, for example, is closely linked to asbestos exposure. Selikoff, Churg & Ham-
mond, Relation Between Exposure to Asbestos and Mesothelioma, 272 NEW ENG. J. MED. 560, 565
(1965). Mesothelioma is a form of cancer that originates in the lining of the lung or abdominal wall
and has been principally linked to asbestos. Id.
Asbestos exposure has been linked to a number of diseases, including asbestosis, mesothelioma, and
lung cancer. See generally Selikoff, Bader, Bader, Churg & Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplasia, 42
AM. J. MED. 487 (1967) (discussion of asbestosis and its effect on industrial workers); Selikoff, Churg
& Hammond, Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia, J. A.M.A., Apr. 6, 1964, at 22 (discussing the link
between asbestos exposure and the growth of tumors).
8. Nichols & Zeckhauser, OSHA After a Decade: A Time for Reason, in CASE STUDIES IN REGU-
LATION 202, 216 (L. Weiss & M. Klass ed. 1981).
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suits against manufacturers of hazardous products used in the workplace
in order to circumvent the restrictions of workers' compensation systems,
and thus obtain additional compensation for job-related disease.9 The po-
tential liability of manufacturers through such suits is enormous." This
rapid growth in the number of products liability suits may threaten the
viability of entire industries. For instance, the estimated value of valid
claims against the asbestos industry exceeds the combined financial re-
sources of all asbestos producers and their insurers." The bankruptcies
resulting from liability for asbestos-related disease, moreover, could pre-
clude subsequent suits by workers who later discover that their illnesses
are asbestos-related. 2
It is thus indisputable that occupational disease is a serious national
problem. 8 The next section explains why market forces cannot be relied
upon as a solution.
9. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 921-26 (1980).
See infra text accompanying notes 73-98 for further discussion of the products liability approach to
occupational disease compensation.
10. The recent asbestos litigation illustrates the magnitude of the products liability problem.
Manville Corp. (formerly Johns-Manville), one of the leading asbestos producers, had 16,500 suits
pending against it in 1982. Epstein, Manville: The Bankruptcy of Products Liability Law, REGULA-
TION, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 14, 14. At that time, the potential cost of Manville's liability for suits
pending was estimated to be $660 million. GOVERNMENT RESEARCH CORP., VICTIM COMPENSATION:
THE POLICY DEBATE 12 (1983). More than 100,000 additional suits against Manville are anticipated
in the next decade. Id. In all, some 30,000 claims against approximately 260 asbestos manufacturers
and suppliers were filed through mid-1982. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
The settlements in asbestos-related death cases averaged $72,000 over the period from 1967 to
1976. I. SELIKOFF, DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS-ASSOCIATED DISEASE IN THE UNITED
STATES 11 (1982) (report prepared for U.S. Dep't of Labor). An average of $28,500 of this amount
was spent to cover legal fees. Id. The total price tag to the industry as of 1982 for compensation
payments and legal expenses was approximately $1 billion, with one-third paid by asbestos producers
and two-thirds paid by insurance firms. J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER & M. SHANLEY,
COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION, at v (1983) [hereinafter cited as J. KAKALIK]. As significant as these
amounts may seem, the major costs of asbestos-related disease will come from future cases. One study
estimates that the present value of all future liability is approximately $38.2 billion. P. MacAvoy, J.
Karr & P. Wilson, The Economic Consequences of Asbestos-Related Disease 76 (Jan. 1982) (Yale
School of Organization and Management Working Paper No. 27) (paper on file with the Yale Jour-
nal on Regulation) [hereinafter cited as P. MacAvoy].
11. Asbestos industry liability, expressed in current dollars, is estimated to be $38.2 billion. P.
MacAvoy, supra note 10, at 76. The net worth of the asbestos industry is approximately $25.6 billion.
Id. at 78. The combined net worth of the insurance companies that have been involved in asbestos
claims so far is $11.5 billion. Id. at 76.
12. Note, supra note 2, at 1122.
13. Despite its potentially enormous dimensions, the occupational disease problem looks less for-
midable when placed in proper perspective. For example, most reliable studies of the many suspected
causes of cancer suggest that occupational exposures play a relatively small role, accounting for less
than five percent of all cancer cases. See Doll & Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates
of Avoidable Risks of Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1191, 1240
(1981). About four percent of U.S. cancer deaths result from occupational exposures to carcinogens.
Id. at 1245, 1256.
The small role played by occupational exposure in causing cancer highlights the potential inequity
of compensating occupational disease victims separately from non-occupational disease victims. On one
hand, the cost of fully compensating all cancer victims, regardless of cause, may be prohibitive. On the
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II. The Market Paradigm and Why It Fails
When market forces can provide efficient and equitable results, govern-
ment intervention should be avoided. Theoretically, in the case of occupa-
tional disease, market transactions between employers and employees
could lead to efficient levels of health hazards and equitable compensation
for diseased workers. In practice, however, imperfect information and con-
straints on employee mobility prevent this outcome. This market failure
justifies government action to regulate health risks and compensate disease
victims. Such intervention must be guided, however, by sound principles
and common sense.
This section first examines the manner in which an efficiently operating
market would compensate occupational disease victims and regulate health
risks. It then discusses the reasons for market failure and the consequent
need for government intervention.
A. Efficient Health and Compensation Levels: The Market Paradigm
The economic theory of efficiency provides a useful standard for evalu-
ating occupational disease policies. Health risks will be at an "efficient"
level whenever the incremental cost of an extra health precaution is ex-
actly offset by the social value of that precaution."' At this theoretical
optimum, the marginal cost of additional precautions will exceed the mar-
ginal benefits of such precautions and the marginal savings of reduced
precautions will be less than the social cost of the added risk. The efficient
level of health precautions will also be the point at which the sum of the
social cost of occupational disease and the cost of avoiding occupational
disease is minimized. 5 Ordinarily, the decentralized operation of the mar-
ket economy-the "invisible hand"-allocates resources most efficiently.
Hence, before imposing government solutions, policy makers should first
determine whether market transactions between employers and employees
can provide efficient health levels and fair compensation.
Under ideal conditions of full information and voluntary job choice,
workers will demand and receive a wage premium for risky jobs. 6 For
the worker at the margin, this risk premium should just offset the
worker's valuation of the job risk.'" If the risk premium were lower, then
other hand, occupational disease victims arc no more deserving of compensation than other disease
victims.
14. See W. Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE 38-42 (1983).
15. See Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 210. The general question of what is an efficient
level of precaution is discussed more fully in the accident avoidance context in G. CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-94 (1970).
16. See W. VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 37-58.
17. Assuming all workers are paid the same wage, inframarginal workers may receive more risk
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the marginal worker would not take the job. If it were higher, the number
of applicants would increase and drive the wage premium down. Risk
premiums also encourage firms to achieve a socially optimal level of work-
place hazards. 8 Employers will lower health risks whenever the cost of
extra health precautions is less than the savings in reduced risk premiums
that result from the extra safety measures.
In an efficient market, moreover, a worker could invest his risk premi-
ums in insurance if he wanted protection against the risk of economic
losses due to occupational disease. Each worker could purchase coverage
up to the point at which the benefit of additional insurance was exactly
equal to its cost. " Alternatively, the employer could take out insurance for
the worker and decrease wages by the amount of the insurance premium.
If all markets were operating efficiently, the resulting combination of risk
premiums and insurance coverage would provide socially optimal levels of
workplace health quality and occupational disease compensation.
B. Why Markets Fail
As the previous discussion indicates, the occupational disease problem
would be largely eliminated if workers could make fully-informed, volun-
tary job choices. Unfortunately, this assumption does not represent the
way the labor market actually works. Informational inadequacies and ex-
ternalities2" associated with occupational disease make the free market
compensation than they would need to accept the job.
18. Much of the discussion in this Article focuses on the relationship between public policy and
the incentives for employers to behave in ways that reduce the workplace health risks faced by their
employees. Employees also exercise some control over the risks they face. However, there are two
reasons why employees are a poor target for public policy designed to reduce occupational disease.
First, employees have relatively poor information about workplace risks and little control over them.
Most workers facing toxic exposures do not understand the risks or the manner in which their own
behavior can affect those risks. Furthermore, because of the nature of the employer-employee relation-
ship, the worker may have little control over work practices or the types of materials or safety equip-
ment used in his plant. Second, employees already have sufficient incentives to minimize the risks they
face to the fullest extefit possible. Low compensation levels ensure that workers have no incentive to
expose themselves intentionally to unnecessary risks. Therefore, this article will focus on creating
proper incentives for employers, and not employees.
19. See generally W. ViscusI, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PER-
FORMANCE 16-17 (1979) (discussing the optimal level of insurance coverage for workers). Insurance
benefits will not always fully restore the worker's welfare. Even with perfectly competitive and acces-
sible insurance markets, a worker will always be better off before he contracts an occupational disease
than after he receives insurance payments as compensation, if he suffers a permanent health impair-
ment which causes more than simple economic losses. The non-economic damages that accompany
permanent disability are not adequately compensated by insurance benefits.
20. Externalities are costs associated with an activity that are not borne by the decision maker
undertaking the activity and that thus are not fully considered. In this case, if compensation for an
employee's occupational disease is paid by the government's general fund rather than by the employer,
then the employer will not consider fully the costs of occupational disease in making operating deci-
sions. See infra text accompanying note 33.
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particularly ineffective in reducing occupational disease risks and compen-
sating disease victims. 1
The standard economic model of job choice and insurance decisions
rests primarily on the assumption that workers perceive and understand
the risks they face in the workplace. 2 The occupational disease problem,
however, is replete with informational inadequacies for all parties con-
cerned. Workers may be unaware of the risks associated with current and
future exposures to chemicals and other health hazards. 3 The medical
access rules 24 and recent chemical labeling standards25 promulgated by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) may improve
worker knowledge somewhat, but awareness of the contents of chemical
containers is unlikely to give workers much useful information about the
nature or health impact of workplace exposures.
Even with some information about the hazards of workplace materials,
the worker is still in a poor position to assess the health risk he faces and
to evaluate that risk in monetary terms. Workplace risk assessments are
very complex; the unsophisticated worker cannot be expected to under-
stand the ongoing debates in the scientific community over the relationship
between exposure and health risk.2  Risk may be affected by factors that
the worker would not suspect to be relevant. For instance, different demo-
graphic groups have different susceptibilities." Workers may not realize
that health risks are compounded by their non-work behavior patterns,
21. See W. VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 40-41. Although informational shortcomings also may limit
the effectiveness of the free market in regulating and compensating victims of occupational accidents,
the greater informational inadequacy with regard to occupational disease makes market failure in this
area particularly difficult to overcome. There is some evidence that market forces are at work in the
health and safety area, albeit somewhat imperfectly. According to my research, workers receive as
much as $69 billion in risk premiums for hazardous jobs. Id. at 44. This wage compensation amounts
to about $500,000 per fatality for workers facing large risks and $3 million or more per fatality for
workers in safer jobs. Id. at 106.
There is also some less tangible evidence that workers perceive and understand some of the risk of
occupational disease. More than half of all blue-collar workers are aware of at least some hazards of
the job. W. VISCUSI, supra note 19, at 246. Two-fifths of the hazards cited were health rather than
safety hazards. Id. at 264. More specifically, workers tend to recognize the risk of exposure to radia-
tion, dust, and communicable diseases. For those health risks that workers perceive, the amount of
compensation demanded is similar to that received for comparable safety risks. These perceptions of
risk will no doubt be enhanced by the new OSHA labeling standards. Hazard Communication, 48
Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200). Recent joint research suggests that
workers will respond to such warnings by demanding higher wage premiums. W. Viscusi & C.
O'Connor, Adaptive Responses to Job Hazard Information (1983) (Center for the Study of Business
Regulation Working Paper No. 83-9, Duke University) (forthcoming in 74 AM. ECON. REV. (1984)).
22. See W. VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 59-63.
23. See id. at 59.
24. Access to Employee Exposure and Medical Records, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1983).
25. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200).
26. See, for example, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSEMBLY OF LIFE SCIENCES, BYSSINOSIS:
CLINICAL AND RESEARCH ISSUES 2-3 (1982), for a summary of the debate over the health effects of
cotton dust exposure.
27. See W. VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 132-35.
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such as cigarette smoking.2 Even when the risk relationships are well
understood, workers face difficulties in converting the risk into monetary
terms that could be used in bargaining in the job market. Workers cannot
predict the precise effects of health risks on longevity and quality of life
once a disease has manifested itself. Finally, individuals tend to misassess
the risk of low probability/high cost events,2 ' such as occupational disease.
These informational problems will lead workers to demand lower wage
premiums and less insurance than if they were fully cognizant of the risks
of occupational disease. Employers will consequently have less financial
incentive to reduce workplace health hazards. Failures in the insurance
market will exacerbate these problems.3 0
Collective action by unionized workers can mitigate some of these diffi-
culties. For example, many large unions have specialized expertise on risk
issues and possess the bargaining power to exact wage premiums and
health precautions from employers."1 Unions can have only a limited ef-
fect on the occupational health problem, however, since they rep-
resent only about twenty percent of the nation's workers.3 2
Market transactions between individual workers and employers also fail
to account for externalities associated with occupational disease. Cur-
rently, neither workers nor employers pay the full cost of occupational
illness. Instead, other segments of society, such as social security taxpayers
and members of industry-wide insurance pools, bear much of the cost of
treating occupational disease.3 3 Indeed, the costs of products liability suits
have very broad ramifications. At the extreme, liability awards that force
companies out of business harm all uncompensated victims of occupational
disease by substantially reducing their chances of receiving full
28. Data showing the link between cigarette smoking and asbestos-related cancer was presented in
Selikoff, Hammond & Churg, Asbestos Exposure, Smoking and Neoplasia, J. A.M.A., Apr. 8, 1968,
at 104, 106.
29. See Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. POL'Y 227 (1976).
See generally Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 1 (1982)
(arguing that many markets involving uncertain future costs or benefits evidence economically irra-
tional individual behavior).
30. Insurance markets will fail to provide adequate compensation in four situations: if workers do
not have full information about various insurance options; if workers in only the riskiest jobs take out
insurance (adverse selection); if insured workers exercise less caution (moral hazard); or if access to
insurance was blocked by excessive cash payment requirements or some other form of discrimination.
See generally W. VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 78-79 (market level of insurance will not be adequate if
workers misperceive risks to be insured against or if workers in low-risk jobs choose not to participate
because of cost).
31. The importance of unions is reflected in the much higher risk premiums received by unionized
workers. See W. VISCUSI, supra note 19, at 254-59. See also L. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY
AND HEALTH 56-102 (1980), for a detailed discussion of the bargaining advantages unions possess in
negotiating health and safety improvements and in enforcing health and safety rules.
32. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1984, at 439 (1983).
33. See Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 208-09.
Yale Journal on Regulation
compensation in the future.3 4 Products liability suits have the added effect
of creating congestion in the courts. 5 These externalities lead workers and
employers to undervalue the true social cost of occupational disease and
thus to put too little emphasis on risk reduction and disease insurance.
III. A Critique of Regulatory and Compensation Policies
The above-mentioned market failures require that the government im-
plement programs to address the occupational disease problem. Many
such programs have been implemented or proposed. OSHA regulations
are designed to lower disease risk, and workers' compensation and prod-
ucts liability suits provide a poiential source of compensation for disease
victims. In addition, various legislative proposals address the problem of
compensating occupational illness. Unfortunately, these haphazard ap-
proaches have failed to provide a comprehensive strategy for achieving ef-
ficient levels of health risk and fair compensation for all disease victims.
A. Direct Regulation of Disease Risks
OSHA, created in 1970, has responsibility for ensuring that, "so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation [has] safe and
healthful working conditions."" Although OSHA has issued many regu-
lations designed to reduce workplace exposure to hazardous substances,
these rules have been inefficient and largely ineffective. 87 In addition,
OSHA regulations do not, and cannot, provide a comprehensive compen-
sation system or prevent existing compensation. programs from inef-
ficiently influencing the overall level of workplace health risk.
OSHA has taken a number of steps to regulate exposure to hazardous
substances in the workplace. For instance, OSHA has regulated asbestos,
the leading workplace carcinogen, since 1972."8 The agency recently is-
sued an emergency standard that will reduce permissible asbestos levels to
twenty-five percent of the previous standard. 9 OSHA also regulates cot-
ton dust in textile plants,4 which is a major cause of byssinosis, a poten-
tially disabling lung disease. Although the agency regulates a variety of
34. See Note, supra note 2, at 1122.
35. Manville Corp. expects that at least 50,000 asbestos-related products liability'suits will be
,filed against it. Id. at 1122 n.7.. ; I .. .. . . .
36. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 2,*84 Stat. 1590, 1590
(1971) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1983)).
37. See W. VISCuSI, supra-note 14, at 32-36.
38. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1983).
39. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,086 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(k)) (amending 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1001 to reduce permissible exposure levels from an eight hour time-weighted standard
of 2 fibers per cubic centimeter to 0.5 fibers per cubic centimeter).
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1983).
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other workplace carcinogens,"1 it has promulgated workplace standards
for only a small fraction of the more than 2000 occupational carcinogens
that have been identified.' To fill this gap, OSHA recently issued a haz-
ard communication regulation that would require worker education pro-
grams and labeling of hazardous chemicals."" OSHA estimates that this
regulation eventually will eliminate roughly one-fifth of all cases of occu-
pational cancer."'
In recent years, however, OSHA has been sharply criticized for issuing
rigid command-and-control regulations, which reduce employers' flex-
ibility to meet health goals in the most cost-effective manner." The
agency also has been castigated for its failure to measure the costs and
benefits of its rules" and for its dismal enforcement record.' 7 Not surpris-
ingly, most studies show that OSHA has had only marginal success in
improving workplace health and safety."
Some tactical reforms could improve OSHA's effectiveness. In many
cases, OSHA's rules could be more cost-effective if the agency issued per-
formance standards rather than mandating specific technological methods
to reduce exposure. In the case of cotton dust, for example, OSHA could
allow a firm to reduce the risk of byssinosis through the use of disposable
cotton dust masks" or through rotation of workers who have displayed
early signs of the disease." OSHA enforcement could be improved by del-
egating more enforcement authority to unions and other certified labor
organizations."
Even if these reforms were adopted, OSHA regulation would address
only part of the occupational disease problem. The agency has no author-
41. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1000-.1050 (1983).
42. W. VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 14.
43. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200).
44. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DRAFT REG-
ULATORY ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
STANDARD 1-43 (1981).
45. See Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 214-16.
46. See W. VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 16-28; Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 214-21.
47. The agency has been criticized for focusing on trivial violations and taking an adversarial
attitude towards the firms it regulates. In addition, OSHA penalties are generally too low to induce
compliance. See W. VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 6-36.
48. See, e.g., id. at 32-35; Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 216-19.
49. See W. VISCUSI, supra note 14, at 126.
50. Rotation will be effective only if there is some threshold point below which exposures are not
risky, or if frequent exposures to small doses of hazardous substances cause less overall risk than a
single large exposure.
Cytogenetic testing (testing of changes in human chromosome structure) can be used as a means of
detecting cancer susceptibility in individual workers. Note, Occupationally Induced Cancer Suscepti-
bility: Regulating the Risk, 96 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698-700 (1983). Such tests could be used to
determine more precisely when a worker should be pulled off a job that exposes him to hazardous
substances.
51. See L. BACOW, supra note 31, at 103.
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ity to compensate disease victims, and it cannot control the effects of ex-
isting compensation programs on levels of health risk. A separate compen-
sation system is clearly needed, one which will not interfere with OSHA
attempts to regulate health hazards and which will still provide a mini-
mally acceptable level of income support to disease victims. As the follow-
ing discussion shows, current compensation policies fail to achieve these
goals.
B. Workers' Compensation Programs
Prior to the advent of workers' compensation programs, workers who
were injured on the job or who contracted a job-related disease could
bring tort actions against their employers. If the worker could prove that
the employer was negligent in a way that caused the injury or disease, and
that the worker had not contributed to his own injury or disease, then he
would have a good chance of receiving a judgment.5" Because of the diffi-
culties in proving negligence and causation," however, all states have es-
tablished workers' compensation systems to replace tort suits against
employers.k
Under the workers' compensation system, the worker does not have to
prove employer negligence. This makes it easier-and less costly-to ob-
tain an award. However, unlike tort recovery, workers' compensation does
not attempt to restore to the claimant what he has lost.15 Instead, a work-
ers' compensation award consists of no more than two-thirds of the
worker's lost earnings and makes no allowance for non-economic losses
such as pain and suffering. Thus an award is usually significantly smaller
than the potential recovery from a successful tort suit.56 In addition, work-
ers' compensation statutes prevent employees from bringing tort suits
against their employers for workplace injuries or diseases.
57
This discussion focuses first on the barriers to winning workers' com-
pensation claims. It then highlights the equity concerns presented by
workers' compensation programs. The third part of the discussion demon-
strates that these plans are inefficient because workers' compensation pre-
miums often are not linked to the riskiness of particular workplaces.
52. See generally I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 4.00-.40 (1984).
53. See id. at § 4.30.
54. For a summary of the history of workers' compensation in the United States, see id. at §§
5.20-.30. For a comparison of workers' compensation benefits and product liability settlements, see
Viscusi, Alternative Approaches to Valuing the Health Impacts of Accidents: Liability Law and Pro-
spective Evaluations, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 49, 62-67.
55. See I A. LARSON, supra note 52, at § 2.40.
56. Id. at § 2.50.
57. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 52, at §§ 65.00-.39.
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1. Barriers to Recovery
Two features of workers' compensation systems impede adequate recov-
ery. First, to qualify for workers' compensation, a claimant must show
that he suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment.5" This causation requirement is fairly straightforward in cases in-
volving work-related injuries, but is much more problematic in occupa-
tional disease cases. Most workers' compensation statutes require that a
disease be "peculiar to the worker's occupation ' '5' and not simply one of
the "ordinary diseases of life." 60 The problem, as discussed above, is that
the precise cause of a disease may be extremely difficult to diagnose."
Even if a medical basis exists for determining the cause of a disease,
records may not be available to describe the worker's history of exposure
to hazardous substances. Moreover, a long gestation period increases the
likelihood that only limited evidence will be available to prove that a dis-
ease is job-related.
The second impediment to adequate recovery is the requirement that
the worker report the injury and file a claim within a specified period.
Thus, even if a worker can satisfy the other requirements under the work-
ers' compensation statute, he may still fail to collect if the statute of limi-
tations has expired." In a few states, the period during which claims must
be filed starts at the time of the "accident." In cases involving latent inju-
ries, some courts have interpreted "accident" to mean the initiating inci-
dent (e.g., exposure to chemical hazards), rather than the onset of the
disability." In such states, the statute of limitations may run before the
worker realizes that he is the victim of a compensable disability."
58. Note, supra note 9, at 921. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 65.1-46 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. §
656.802(a) (1981).
59. Note, supra note 9, at 921. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 25-5-110, 25-5-111 (1975); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 418.401(b) (West Supp. 1984).
60. Note, supra note 9, at 921. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-280(3) (1982); VA. CODE § 65.1-
46 (1980).
61. For example, a disease may have numerous potential causes, several of which may have actu-
ally contributed to the manifestation of the illness. Thus, a worker may not know what factors caused
his disease or whether workplace hazards were involved. The job-relatedness requirement is some-
times coupled with an explicit requirement that a worker be exposed to the hazard for a specific
length of time, such as five to ten years, before becoming eligible for compensation, even though the
disease may have been caused by a briefer exposure. See Note, supra note 9, at 923. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-5alO (1973) (pertaining to silicosis).
62. For a discussion of the application of workers' compensation claim periods, see 3 A. LARSON,
supra note 52, at §§ 78.41-.42, 78.52.
63. Id. at § 78.42(b).
64. Id. at § 78.42(b)-.42(c). In some states, workers' compensation for occupational diseases is
available only if disability or death occurs within a specified period after the last injurious exposure to
the hazard. For example, the Georgia statute disallows claims unless the death or disability occurs
within three years, for asbestosis or silicosis, or within one year, for all other occupational diseases, of
the last exposure to the workplace hazard. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-281(b) (1982).
Yale Journal on Regulation
2. Equity Concerns
Statistics on actual compensation reflect the inequities that result from
the causation and reporting requirements of workers' compensation plans.
They show that workers' compensation systems often do not provide com-
parable levels of compensation to equally deserving victims. For instance,
victims of occupational injuries have had more success securing workers'
compensation benefits than have victims of occupational disease."' Em-
ployers are six times more likely to contest a disease claim than an acci-
dent claim." A disabled worker with an occupational disease must wait
an average of one year before receiving benefits, while workers bringing
injury claims wait an average of only two months.67 Statistics also show
that victims of occupational illnesses receive lower benefits, on average,
than victims of occupational accidents."' This discrepancy occurs in part
because of the greater likelihood that disease victims will negotiate settle-
ments and in part because it is more difficult to demonstrate that an occu-
pational disease is job-related.69
In addition, these statistics record only the outcomes of claims actually
filed. Because of the difficulty in proving job-relatedness, many workers
suffering from occupational disease never file compensation claims. When
job-relatedness is less difficult to prove, however, the success rate for com-
pensation increases dramatically. 0 The asbestos situation provides a good
example: Sixty-one percent of the workers' compensation claims filed for
asbestos-related deaths are fully awarded, twenty-five percent receive
modified compensation levels, three percent are denied, and one percent
are dropped.
7 1
65. In 1974, 15% of victims of workplace injuries received workers' compensation benefits, but
only 5% of occupational disease victims received compensation benefits. INTERIM REPORT, supra note
3, at 61.
The difficulty in winning disease claims is mitigated, to a certain extent, by the fact that other
forms of social insurance supplement workers' compensation programs. In 1974, only 5% of occupa-
tional disease victims received workers' compensation, whereas 53% received social security, 21% re-
ceived pensions, 17% received veterans benefits, 16% received public welfare, and 1% received private
insurance benefits. Id. at 61. Thirty-four percent of workers disabled by occupational disease received
support from more than one source; about 20% got support from none of these sources. Id. at 58-59.
Overall, public and private compensation for severely disabled victims of occupational disease replaces
40% of all lost wages. Id. at 56-57.
Compensation under some other insurance programs is fairly automatic. Social security disability
insurance, for example, provides income support to disabled workers regardless of cause, with the
level of compensation hinging on a formula linked to the worker's past earnings. 42 U.S.C. §§ 415,
423 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 130-135 for further discussion of the advantages of
social security as a form of compensation for occupational disease victims.
66. See Note, supra note 9, at 923; INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
67. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
68. Id. at 57.
69. See Note, supra note 9, at 922; INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 3, 75.
70. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 70.
71. I. SELIKOFF, supra note 10, at 425.
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In addition to producing discrepancies between diseased and injured
workers, the job-relatedness requirement of workers' compensation pro-
grams ensures that some equally deserving diseased workers will receive
dramatically different levels of compensation. That is, some victims will
receive full workers' compensation awards while other victims will come
away empty-handed. Workers' compensation programs also create a dis-
parity between workers and non-workers. Because of workers' compensa-
tion, diseased workers have an advantage over people who contract similar
diseases from non-occupational sources. Policy makers rarely address
whether this discrepancy is justified.
3. Efficiency Concerns
Besides creating numerous inequities, workers' compensation programs
also fail to promote efficient levels of health risk. The compensation plans
are funded by employer premiums that are often only loosely based on
workplace health and safety conditions."' The premiums therefore have
relatively little effect on firms' incentives to provide a healthful work envi-
ronment. Accordingly, even when workers' compensation premiums do in-
fluence health risk levels, they influence risk levels in a less efficient way
than do direct taxes on hazardous operations.
To sum up, workers' compensation programs are deficient in that they
substantially impede adequate recovery, fail to provide comparable com-
pensation to equally deserving victims, and fail to influence risk levels
efficiently. In response to the inadequacies of workers' compensation as a
compensation mechanism, disease victims have flooded the courts with
products liability suits. Unfortunately, as discussed next, this development
has only made a bad situation worse.
C. Products Liability Suits
As already noted, workers' compensation programs forbid private ac-
tions against employers and provide a limited level of compensation.7"
Over the past decade, however, disease victims have attempted to circum-
vent the restrictions of workers' compensation programs by bringing prod-
ucts liability claims against the manufacturers of hazardous materials used
in the workplace.7' Depending on the state where the lawsuit is filed,
workers can seek relief under a negligence or strict liability theory of
72. See Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 209. The link between workplace conditions and
workers' compensation costs is strongest for large employers and self-insured firms.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
74. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 16. The shortcomings of the products liability system as a
compensation scheme have been dramatically illustrated by the asbestos experience. See id. at 44-46.
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tort."' Because of the wide acceptance and use of strict liability lawsuits,7 6
this discussion focuses on the effectiveness of such lawsuits in compensa-
ting victims and providing incentives for workplace health improvements.
This section first examines the barriers to recovery in products liability
suits. It then shows that such suits create serious inequities among disease
victims. Finally, it argues that tort suits provide a poor mechanism for
promoting efficient levels of health risk.
1. Barriers to Recovery
To prevail under a strict liability theory, a victim must establish that
the product was defective, that the defect proximately caused the injury,
and that the defendant was the manufacturer of the defective product.7  A
plaintiff in an occupational disease case encounters uniquely difficult
proof problems with each of these three elements.
Under strict liability doctrine, a defective product is one that is unrea-
sonably dangerous.7 8 Consumer products are typically found to be unrea-
sonably dangerous because of a manufacturing flaw or an unsafe product
design.7 0 However, a product also may be unreasonably dangerous if the
manufacturer fails to give warnings or directions to users of the product as
to its safe use.80 Failure to warn has been the basis for holding manufac-
turers liable in most cases in which a product was alleged to have caused
an occupational disease."s The victim must establish that the manufac-
turer knew or should have known about the hazards at the time of the
failure to warnS 9-a difficult task given that the link between many prod-
ucts and occupational diseases has been established only recently." As a
75. For a description of these possible approaches and their shortcomings, see SUPERFUND SEC-
TION 301(E) STUDY GROUP, SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D
SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LE-
GAL REMEDIES, pt. 1 at 96-132 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP REPORT].
76. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 694 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT).
78. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 SW.L.J. 5, 14-15 (1965).
79. See, e.g., Wagner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1979); Simien v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 566 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1978); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143
CaI.Rptr. 225 (1978).
80. RESTATEMENT, supra note 77, § 402A, comment j.
81. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
82. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 76 at 697. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). But cf. Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 202-04, 447 A.2d 539, 545-46 (1982) (under strict
liability theory, knowledge of a product's dangerous nature is imputed to the manufacturer and
unknowability of the product's hazards is not a valid defense for failure to give adequate warnings).
83. For example, the first evidence suggesting the carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride was not re-
ported until 1970. S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 104 (1979).
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defense, the manufacturer can present evidence that the victim was aware
of the risk and incurred it voluntarily. 4
Under the second proof requirement, a plaintiff must show that the
manufacturer's product was the proximate cause of his disease."8 As dis-
cussed in connection with worker's compensation, proving what caused an
occupational disease can be extremely difficult."" Uncertainties in the rela-
tionship between exposure levels and health effects, problems of multiple
causes, and long latency periods between exposure and manifestation all
significantly reduce the probability of establishing proximate cause.
Under the third proof requirement, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant manufactured the hazardous product that led to his injury."7
This burden is easily met in some situations, but very difficult to meet in
others. Consider, for example, a worker who has been exposed to asbestos
while working for several different employers, each of which used several
different asbestos suppliers."
Other problems can also prevent recovery. The relevant statute of limi-
tations may expire before many disease victims know that they are ill or
that their disease is related to exposures to particular products.' 9 Even
84. RESTATEMENT, supra note 77, § 523; see also id. § 402A, comment n. Manufacturers of
hazardous products can reduce their potential future liability by informing product users of the risks
they face. Voluntary chemical hazard labeling by manufacturers is motivated largely by the desire to
minimize potential liability.
85. RESTATEMENT, supra note 77, §§ 431, 433. Under strict liability theory, proximate cause is
established when the product is shown to be a substantial factor in bringing about the disease.
86. See supra text accompanying note 61.
87. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 76, at 713.
88. See SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 75, at 56-62; Epstein, supra note 10, at
16. Even if the plaintiff can identify all the suppliers, join them as defendants, and convince the jury
that they caused his disease, the court must still decide how to allocate liability among the various
defendants. In addition, a producer that is held liable may be faced with its own set of liability
allocation issues. Its liability may need to be allocated among several insurance companies, which in
turn may have sold off much of the policy to excess carriers or reinsurance companies. See Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1044-47 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct.
1644 (1982). The terms of policies written decades ago may not make clear which party is responsible
for occupational diseases that were unanticipated at the time.
Assignment of liability becomes particularly difficult when the worker has been exposed to hazards
at a series of workplaces or when a single employer has been covered by a series of insurers. In such
situations, the critical problem is determining which point in the exposure-latency-manifestation chain
triggers liability. Under an exposure theory, the insurer at the time of the hazardous exposure is
liable. Under a manifestation theory, the insurer at the time the worker became ill is liable. See id. at
1047 (holding that both exposure and manifestation trigger insurance policy coverage). Cf Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982) (favoring the manifestation
theory), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1279, 1280 (1983); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insula-
tions, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), afl'd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814 (1981) (applying expo-
sure theory under Illinois and New Jersey laws); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128
(5th Cir. 1981) (endorsing the exposure theory).
89. SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 75, at 43. The time limits contained in the
statutes vary, but they typically run from one to six years after the date of injury in negligence and
strict liability lawsuits. Note, supra note 9, at 920. The effect of these statutes of limitations is espe-
cially onerous in those states where the time period begins on the date of exposure to the hazard. See
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when the victim wins a jury award, his recovery may still be thwarted by
a judgment-proof defendant. A firm faced with multiple, unanticipated
tort claims may not have adequate resources to compensate all the victims
and may have to declare bankruptcy. 90 Alternatively, mass tort claims
against an insured manufacturer may exceed the resources of its insurance
company.91 Finally, workers exposed to risk in the manufacture of haz-
ardous products cannot bring products liability suits against their employ-
ers because workers' compensation is their exclusive remedy.92 Hence,
products liability suits are available only to those industrial disease victims
who can attribute their diseases to the products of manufacturers other
than their employers. Despite these severe barriers to recovery, some cate-
gories of occupational disease victims rely heavily on the products liability
system for compensation, 8
2. Equity Concerns
There are inherent inequities in a policy relying on products liability
law. First, suits by workers with comparable work-related diseases may
have quite inconsistent outcomes because a plaintiff's success in a products
liability suit often hinges on such unpredictable factors as the length of the
latency period or the availability of evidence showing whose products
caused the illness.
Second, the level of recovery in successful suits may vary widely among
equally deserving victims. The variation in awards is explained in part by
the method of calculating tort damages. A court uses a damage award to
compensate the victim for the particular losses he has suffered because of
the tort; consistency with awards won by similar plaintiffs is not a
criterion.
Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1683, 1683 (1983).
Some states have tried to ease the harshness of these time limits by passing laws that toll the statute
of limitations until a disease has manifested itself. SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 75,
at 44. Other states have gone further and passed laws which toll the running of the statute until the
time when the individual has ascertained or reasonably could have ascertained the connection between
exposure to the workplace hazard and the illness. Id. at 43-44.
90. Manville Corp., one of the world's leading producers of asbestos, filed for Chapter 11 protec-
tion in August 1982 because of products liability suits arising from asbestos production. Wall St. J.,
Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Two other asbestos producers, UNR Industries, Inc. and Amatex Corp.,
have filed Chapter 11 petitions largely because of asbestos suits. Note, supra note 2, at 1121 n.6.
91. See P. MacAvoy, supra note 10, at 76.
92. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 52, at §§ 65.00-.39.
93. The most obvious example of this reliance is the current rash of products liability suits filed
by asbestos applicators against the major manufacturers. As of August 1982, 30,000 such suits had
been filed against Manville Corporation and other asbestos manufacturers and suppliers. Wall St. J.,
Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6. Manville expects a total of 120,000 suits by 1990. GOVERNMENT RE-
SEARCH CORP., supra note 10, at 12.
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Third, because the products liability system is not coordinated with
other forms of compensation, a successful plaintiff may not only receive a
substantial judgment, but also may receive workers' compensation and so-
cial security payments. Such multiple awards limit the resources that
those systems can distribute to victims who do not receive tort judgments.
3. Efficiency Concerns
Civil liability rules can lead to efficient levels of health risks only if
workers have full information and transaction costs are insubstantial."
Under such conditions, a manufacturer would respond to the threat of
products liability suits by reducing the dangers of its products in the long
run and by settling claims with injured workers in the short run, as long
as the extra cost of such actions did not exceed the manufacturer's ex-
pected savings in avoided liability judgments. An injured worker, on the
other hand, would waive his right to sue (i.e., accept a settlement) as long
as the manufacturer's offer was greater than the worker's expected tort
judgment. Under ideal market conditions, such private transactions would
be efficient in the sense that manufacturers would bear the full social cost
of their production and workers would be adequately compensated for the
injuries suffered.
Unfortunately, ideal market conditions, including perfect information
and costless transactions, do not prevail in the market for workplace
health. Products liability thus has not generated an efficient level of risk
reduction. The efficiency benefits of the current tort liability system are
constrained by high litigation costs, imperfections in the settlement pro-
cess, insurance pooling, intertemporal effects, and the lack of coordination
among risk reduction policies.
The high transactions costs inherent in the tort liability system are il-
lustrated by a recent study suggesting that only 37.5% of premiums paid
for products liability insurance eventually goes to compensate victims.""
Insurance companies, attorneys, expert witnesses, investigators and courts
retain the remaining 62.5%."
Although the settlement process reduces litigation costs, it raises a dif-
ferent set of problems. The manufacturer may not enter into serious
settlement negotiations until a suit has been filed or the worker has
demonstrated a reasonable chance of success in litigation. Many injured
94. For a fuller discussion of the allocative effects of civil liability rules, see Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972).
95. Note, supra note 9, at 928.
96. Id.
Yale Journal on Regulation
workers may be frustrated by this initial hurdle. Even when settlements
are reached, the level of compensation is likely to fall below full compen-
sation for two reasons. First, the expected value of the right to sue, which
forms the theoretical basis for the settlement, is less than full compensa-
tion because it incorporates the probability that the worker would not pre-
vail in court. Second, workers often lack the information and resources
necessary to make an accurate monetary valuation of their right to sue; as
a consequence, they may fail to extract a fair settlement offer from a
manufacturer.
9 7
Insurance pooling creates an additional source of inefficiency. Manufac-
turers often purchase insurance and thus spread the risk of large liability
judgments over a pool of manufacturers. Such risk spreading dilutes the
incentives for particular firms to reduce the hazards of their products in
response to tort liability.
Products liability also fails to create efficient incentives for workplace
safety decisions because of the timing of the judgment relative to the tort.
Tort liability creates the most efficient incentives when the judgment and
the tortious behavior are nearly contemporaneous. Such immediate feed-
back allows the manufacturer to consider all costs in reaching product
safety decisions. In contrast, many occupational diseases involve long la-
tency periods between exposure to the workplace hazard and the manifes-
tation of the resultant disease. In such cases, the manufacturer is held
liable for diseases caused by products marketed many years ago. Such re-
sults provide only a crude incentive to consider future liability in analyz-
ing current product lines.
Finally, some inefficiency is created by the lack of coordination between
tort liability and other policies influencing occupational health risks, such
as OSHA regulations and workers' compensation premiums."8
In short, products liability law strives both to compensate disease vic-
tims and deter workplace health risks. The inability of the products liabil-
ity system to achieve either goal suggests that the objectives of compensa-
tion and reduced health risk must be addressed separately if both are to be
achieved.
D. Federally Administered Compensation Programs
Several federally administered compensation programs have been im-
plemented or proposed to augment or replace the hodgepodge of existing
occupational disease policies. The black lung program currently in effect
97. For a general discussion of the disadvantages of settlement as a method of dispute resolution,
see Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
98. See infra text accompanying note 127.
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provides income support to coal mine workers disabled by black lung dis-
ease.99 An occupational disease compensation bill, recently proposed in the
House of Representatives, would provide benefits for disease victims and
exempt manufacturers of hazardous substances from products liability
suits.1 00 Unfortunately, these compensation systems fail to separate the
objectives of fair compensation and efficient health risks and thus promise
to achieve neither. Furthermore, the costs of these programs are
enormous.
1. Black Lung Program
The Black Lung Benefits Act, originally enacted in 1969,01 was a re-
sponse to the failure of many states to provide benefits to coal miners or
their survivors for disability or death resulting from black lung disease.'0 2
The program created by the Act compensates victims of pneumoconio-
sis,' defined as "a chronic dust disease of the lung . . .arising out of
coal mine employment.""0 " To receive benefits, the miner must show that
he is totally disabled, that the disability is caused by pneumoconiosis and
that the pneumoconiosis resulted from exposures to coal dust.'0 5 The ben-
efit provided is an annuity that is independent of the particular claimant's
wages.' 06
In contrast to state workers' compensation plans, the black lung pro-
gram eases the claimant's burden of proof by incorporating rebuttable
presumptions in favor of the worker. Under the original Act, black lung
disease was presumed to be the cause of death if a diseased miner had
worked in a coal mine for at least ten years.10 7 Furthermore, a worker
was presumed to be totally disabled by black lung disease if he had
worked as a miner for ten years and presented medical evidence of lesions
in the lung.' 0 8 In 1972, the presumptions were expanded so that all res-
piratory and pulmonary impairments were considered to be pneumoconio-
99. Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982). See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3,
at 85-91.
100. H.R. 3175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in The Occupational Disease Compensa-
tion Act of 1983: Hearings on H.R. 3175 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983).
101. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 Stat. 742,
792 (1970) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982)).
102. See 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1982).
103. Id. § 921(a).
104. Id. § 902(b).
105. See id. §§ 902(b), 921(a).
106, See id. § 922(a).
107. Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 411(c)(2), 83 Stat. 742, 793 (1970) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§ 921(c)(2) (1982)).
108. Pub. L. No. 91-173, §§ 411(c)(1), 411(c)(3), 83 Stat. 742, 793 (1970) (codified as amended
at 30 U.S.C. §§ 921(c)(1), 921(c)(3) (1982)).
Yale Journal on Regulation
sis for workers with fifteen years of coal mining employment." 9 In 1981,
these presumptions were cut back severely.110
The annual costs associated with the black lung program mushroomed
from $150 million in 1970 to more than $1 billion by the late 1970's, in
part because of a sizable increase in the number of claims filed."' This
unexpectedly rapid growth should caution policy makers of the uncer-
tainty in forecasting the cost of comprehensive compensation efforts. Ironi-
cally, the danger of such unanticipated growth in cost should have been
relatively small in the coal mining industry because there is good informa-
tion about miners and black lung risks. The black lung experience sug-
gests that it will be very difficult to estimate accurately the cost of broader
compensation schemes which must track large, mobile populations of
workers exposed to minute but harmful amounts of hazardous substances
in many different workplaces.
The black lung program is funded by a tax on coal production: one
dollar per ton for underground mines and fifty cents per ton for surface
mines." ' The tax is inefficient because it is not explicitly linked either to
workplace conditions or to the incidence of disease. Instead of providing
direct incentives for employers to improve workplace health quality, the
production tax creates incentives to reduce overall output.
The black lung program, moreover, raises equity concerns. Although its
system of presumptions eliminates many of the inequities created by the
need to prove causation, the mere existence of a black lung program cre-
ates an undesirable disparity between victims of black lung disease and
victims of comparable illnesses.
2. Occupational Disease Legislation
Congress has not yet enacted any of the legislative attempts 1 to estab-
lish a comprehensive federal compensation plan for disabled asbestos
workers, in part because of their tremendous expected costs. The most
109. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, § 4(c), 86 Stat. 150, 154 (1973)
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (1982)).
110. See Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, §§ 202(b)(1), 202(b)(2),
95 Stat. 1635, 1643 (1982) (amending 30 U.S.C. § 921). Currently, two presumptions remain. Pneu-
moconiosis is presumed to result from coal mine exposures if the miner has been employed in a coal
mine for ten years. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (1982). Medical evidence of lesions in the lung is presumed
to be evidence of total disability due to pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) (1982).
111. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 86-88.
112. 26 U.S.C. § 4121(e) (1982). The original tax rates, which were in effect until the "tempo-
rary increase" in 1981, were 50 cents per ton of coal produced by underground mines and 25 cents
per ton of coal produced by surface mines. 26 U.S.C. § 4121(a) (1982).
113. See Comment, Relief for Asbestos Victims. A Legislative Analysis, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIs.
179, 186-200 (1983), for a discussion of three bills addressing the asbestos-related disease problem
that were considered, but not enacted, by the 97th Congress.
Vol. 2: 53, 1984
Occupational Disease
recent proposal is H.R. 3175,"" introduced by Rep. George Miller. This
bill seeks to use public concern about asbestos exposure to create broader
support for a comprehensive national occupational disease compensation
system. The contemplated scope of the bill, however, appears to be so
broad that the plan may not be economically feasible. In its present form,
moreover, the proposed legislation would do little to promote efficient
levels of health risk.
The eligibility standards for compensation under H.R. 3175 are rela-
tively liberal. The bill would establish a series of presumptions for as-
bestos-related diseases that would make the proof of causation much sim-
pler than it is under worker's compensation or products liability. " ' H.R.
3175 would grant workers an irrebuttable presumption that their dis-
eases-whether asbestosis or mesothelioma-were caused by exposure to
asbestos. " 6 The program would also presume that lung cancer was caused
by asbestos exposure, but this presumption would become irrebuttable
only if there were evidence showing that asbestos had caused changes of
the lung or pleura. " '
H.R. 3175 may do much more than compensate diseased asbestos
workers. Most notably, the bill contains a provision authorizing expansion
of its coverage, by administrative rulemaking, to other disease-causing
substances and to other classes of workers. " 8 In addition, the proposed
program would provide an exclusive remedy for diseased workers with
respect to all "toxic substance market participants," including both
employers and hazardous product manufacturers. " 9 Consequently, all
firms participating in the program would be immune from products liabil-
ity suits.
114. H.R. 3175, supra note 100.
115. Id. at § 6.
116. Id. at § 6(c)(1)-(2).
117. Id. at § 6(c)(3). Many critics have attacked similarly strong presumptions in the black lung
program, claiming that exposure to coal dust was not a significant factor in the disabilities of many
workers compensated under that program. See, e.g., Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative
History Surrounding the Black Lung Interim Presumption and a Survey of its Unresolved Issues, 83
W. VA. L. REV. 869 (1981). See also Occupational Diseases and Their Compensation, Part I:
Asbestos-Related Diseases: Hearings on H.R. 2740 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1979) (statement of Rep. John
Erlenborn) ("[This is j]ust like . . . black lung. The man who has a broken back through a roof fall
and is a quadraplegic [sic] is getting less compensation than someone who may have emphysema from
smoking who, because of assumptions, or presumptions in the act, is getting black lung benefits; and
social security disability; and State workers' compensation.").
118. H.R. 3175, supra note 100, at § 16.
119. Id. at §§ 3(17), 10, 11. Although H.R. 3175 does not clearly state whether the claimant
could bring an action against a "toxic substance market participant" that contributed to the compensa-
tion pool, the implication of sections 10 and 11 read together is that the claimant would be precluded
from bringing such an action.
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Compensation levels offered by H.R. 3175 are high compared to other
compensation schemes, with the exception of damages awarded in success-
ful products liability cases. The current version of the bill would provide
medical benefits as well as two-thirds wage replacement for partial disa-
bility, eighty percent of the national average manufacturing or construc-
tion wage for total disability, and five years of total disability compensa-
tion for the victim's survivors in the event of death.'2 H.R. 3175 would
impose both administrative and compensation costs on participating firms
and their insurers; the government would contribute nothing.'
The liberal presumptions could have an enormous economic effect.
Under H.R. 3175, the present value of the total cost of compensating fa-
talities resulting from asbestos exposure is estimated to be between $16
billion and $30 billion. 22 It might be impossible, however, to determine
which cases of lung cancer in asbestos workers were caused by asbestos
and which were caused by other factors. As a result, all lung cancer in
asbestos workers could be compensable under the program, raising the
present value of the total cost of the program to between $54 billion and
$108 billion." 8 In contrast, estimates of the present value of the total cost
of asbestos products liability suits range between $8 billion and $91 bil-
lion under comparable assumptions. 24 Thus, if its presumptions were ap-
plied liberally, H.R. 3175 might create greater liabilities for industry than
the current products liability law. 2  If manufacturer liability levels actu-
ally increased under H.R. 3175, many firms might be forced out of busi-
ness. In short, the disease compensation promised by the present language
of H.R. 3175 may not be economically viable.
The effect of the proposal on health risks remains uncertain because the
details of the funding mechanism are not specified. The bill would give
120. Id. at § 5: These benefit provisions are more generous than those of workers' compensation
systems. The usual workers' compensation limit is two-thirds of workers' wages up to a specified
ceiling. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STATE WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION LAWS tables 6-7 (1984). Combined workers' compensation and social security disability
benefits cannot exceed 80% of the worker's "average earnings." 42 U.S.C. § 424a (1982).
One report estimates that the present value of benefits paid to a typical disabled worker and surviv-
ing spouse under the H.R. 3175 formulae is $220,000 to $250,000. F. Siskind, The Cost of Compen-
sating Asbestos Victims under the Occupational Disease Compensation Act of 1983, at 32 (Mar.
1984) (paper on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
121. H.R. 3175, supra note 100, at § 11.
122. F. Siskind, supra note 120, at 32. This is an estimate of the cost of compensating "excess"
fatalities. Excess fatalities is a statistic used to denote the difference between the fatality rate observed
in asbestos workers and the fatality rate expected in a similar group not exposed to asbestos.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 5.
125. Firms have used bankruptcy to avoid tort liabilities. H.R. 3175 contains provisions, however,
that attempt to prevent participating companies from avoiding liability through corporate reorganiza-
tion. H.R. 3175, supra note 100, at § 11(0(3). In particular, the bill holds a firm liable for the "total
amount" due under the program, without regard to whether the company's liability has been dis-
charged or reduced by a bankruptcy court. Id. at § 11(f)(3)(B)(i).
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the Secretary of Labor a high degree of discretion in allocating financial
responsibility among firms. But the Secretary, out of economic and admin-
istrative necessity, probably would follow the black lung and
"Superfund"12 models and resort to an output tax. A tax on production
would reduce the output of the affected firms and thereby reduce total risk
somewhat. However, the tax would have little direct influence on overall
health risks because it does not vary with workplace health conditions.
The overall success of an approach such as H.R. 3175 will depend on
its precise funding mechanism and the overall level of compensation it
requires. In its current form, H.R. 3175 puts little emphasis on achieving
an acceptable level of health risk and threatens to impose unmanageable
costs on its industrial participants-a result that will not serve the inter-
ests of future disease victims.
IV. A Proposed Strategy
As the previous discussion shows, existing and proposed occupational
disease policies suffer from many defects. This section presents the out-
lines of a proposal that attempts to avoid these inadequacies. It begins
with a discussion of three general guidelines and then describes how these
guidelines might be implemented.
A. Guidelines for Government Intervention
A more effective occupational disease policy would observe the follow-
ing principles. First, it would recognize the effect of compensation systems
on health risk levels and coordinate these systems with regulatory pro-
grams. Second, it would provide at least an acceptable minimum level of
compensation to all disease victims. Finally, it would distinguish between
past and current exposures.
1. The Incentive Effect of Compensation Plans
The various elements of an occupational disease policy must be coordi-
nated to provide efficient levels of health risk. Such coordination is possi-
ble only if policy makers recognize that compensation schemes not only
provide income support to disease victims, but also can affect workplace
health risks through their funding mechanisms. For example, suppose that
126. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 26
U.S.C. §§ 4611-4682, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), created a government trust fund, known as
"Superfund," to be used for cleanup of hazardous waste and compensation of related damages. The
fund is financed in part by per unit volume taxes on chemical feedstock manufacturing, petroleum
refining, and commercial hazardous waste disposal. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4682 (1982).
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the combination of market transactions and OSHA health regulations pro-
vides the optimal level of risk reduction; in other words, the cost of addi-
tional efforts to reduce health risk just equals the marginal social benefits
of those efforts. In that case, an additional compensation program funded
by a tax based on the riskiness of present operations will cause employers
to provide too much health protection. Taxes might be necessary, but to
the extent possible should be collected without upsetting the conditions
that lead to optimality. 127 Conversely, if market transactions and OSHA
regulations fail to provide enough health protection to workers, a compen-
sation scheme should not only pay illness claims but also encourage em-
ployers to take additional health precautions. In short, occupational dis-
ease policy should account for the incentive effects of compensation plans
on risk levels and coordinate these effects with regulatory programs.
2. Fair Compensation
Occupational disease policy also should monitor overall levels of com-
pensation to ensure that all victims are receiving at least acceptable mini-
mum payments and that compensation levels are similar among compara-
ble groups of victims. Under current policies, similarly situated disease
victims often receive widely different levels of compensation. As discussed
previously, one person may win a multi-million dollar judgment in a
products liability suit, while an equally deserving victim may have his
claim dismissed by a court or rejected by a workers' compensation board
because of difficulties in proving causation.1 8 Similarly dramatic inequi-
ties arise between victims of occupational injuries and victims of occupa-
tional illnesses. 29 Policy makers also should consider whether victims of
occupational diseases deserve to receive more generous compensation than
victims of non-occupational diseases.
3. Past Versus Future Diseases
Finally, decision makers must distinguish between diseases that already
have been contracted and those that will be contracted in the future. A
penalty tax linked to present exposure levels, for example, will encourage
employers to reduce workplace health risks until the marginal cost of ad-
ditional precautions is equal to the tax. In contrast, a penalty tax on past
exposures will not directly induce reductions in current risk levels, though
it might indirectly reduce overall health risk by lowering a firm's profits
127. I use the phrase "to the extent possible" because even a lump sum tax may lower overall
output and thus reduce the total level of health hazards.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
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and output. However, this output reduction effect is a far less effective
means of regulating health risk than establishing an incentive scheme
designed specifically to optimize risk reduction investments.
B. A Proposal for Implementing the Guidelines
To implement these guidelines, I propose that victims be compensated
from a social insurance fund financed by a general payroll tax. Current
workplace conditions should be regulated with a combination of minimum
standards and penalty taxes based on the current hazards of the tax-
payer's workplace. This approach provides a strategy for achieving both
fair compensation and efficient levels of health risk. Because of the analyt-
ical distinction between diseases resulting from past exposure to work-
place hazards and those caused by current hazards, this section addresses
them separately.
1. Diseases Resulting from Past Exposures
Victims whose disease results from past exposure should be compen-
sated from a social insurance fund, such as social security, financed by a
general payroll or income tax. There are several reasons why this is supe-
rior to alternative policies. First, in situations where the disease has al-
ready been caused, consideration of risk reduction incentives is irrelevant,
and risk-based taxes are therefore inappropriate. The disease- inducing
activities have already occurred and the only remaining issue is how much
to compensate victims.
Second, with generally available benefits, inequitable distinctions could
be avoided. Victims of occupational disease would be treated the same as
victims of diseases of unknown origin or victims of diseases caused by
contact with hazardous waste sites. Society has the same impulse to pro-
vide a minimum level of income support and medical care to a disease
victim whether the cause of that person's affliction is occupational,
environmental, or unidentifiable. 30 From an equity standpoint, then, the
appropriate level of compensation should not hinge on how the victim
contracted the disease or whether the illness is job-related. In general, the
compensation decision should depend instead on the effects of the disease
on the victim's well-being and his consequent need for income support.
130. One possible justification for distinguishing occupational disease victims from others might
stem from an inquiry into whether the victim incurred the disease risk voluntarily. For example, if a
heavy cigarette smoker contracts lung cancer, he may be less deserving of assistance than a non-
smoking asbestos worker. People who voluntarily incur large risks thereby reveal that they place a
relatively low value on their health. In practice, though, such refined distinctions cannot be drawn
easily. Volition is difficult to define or detect and thus is not a good criterion for determining disease
compensation levels.
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Thus, I recommend that similarly situated disease victims be eligible for
similar levels of public compensation, regardless of the cause of their ill-
nesses. I also recommend that the social security disability compensation
system1"' be used as the principal mechanism for income support. Under
my proposal, moreover, workers receiving social security compensation
would still be able to bring products liability suits against manufacturers,
but the amount of any resulting judgments would be reduced by the
amount of disability compensation already received.132
Using the social security program has several advantages. It is already
in existence and, unlike workers' compensation, does not require a show-
ing of causality. In addition, social security disability insurance provides
income support for workers with long-term disabilities whether the cause
is occupational or non-occupational. 3 The program thus treats victims of
similar diseases similarly." 4
The social security disability program also has the crucial advantage of
being funded through a broad-based payroll tax rather than through a tax
targeted at particular firms. In one sense, this type of funding is unfair,
because firms not responsible for causing a worker's disease will be
treated the same as those that were responsible. On the other hand, this
perceived inequity only arises in cases where responsible firms can be
identified. It is often impossible to make a precise causal connection be-
tween one's job and the resulting occupational disease. 3
In sum, compensating victims of past diseases through the social secu-
rity system will provide fair levels of income support without penalizing
firms for conditions that can no longer be changed.
2. Diseases Caused by Current Hazards
The government has broader goals in formulating a policy response to
the problem of diseases caused by current hazards. This policy should be
designed to influence not only the level of compensation, but also the level
of disease risk. These two factors still must be addressed separately, how-
131. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-433 (1983). See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, DISABILITY
COMPENSATION: CURRENT ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 8-10 (1982) (brief description of the
social security disability compensation system).
132. A more ambitious alternative would be to preclude all products liability suits by recipients of
administrative compensation. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 46. Such an exclusive remedy rule would
parallel workers' compensation, which prohibits suits against one's employer, and H.R. 3175, which
would prohibit suits against participating employers and manufacturers.
133. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(a), 423(d) (1983).
134. Of course, it may be desirable to augment these benefits above their present levels. This
would be a political judgment hinging primarily on the extent of society's general altruism toward
disease victims rather than on any efficieny or causality-based arguments.
135. For example, asbestos workers who smoke cigarettes may find it impossible to identify which
agent was the "cause" of lung cancer.
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ever, to provide fair compensation without creating inefficient health risk
levels.
My proposal for preventing and compensating future diseases includes:
1) a compensation system such as the social security disability program,
funded primarily by its broad-based payroll tax; 2) a set of informational
requirements to inform workers more fully about workplace hazards; and
3) a direct regulation scheme that integrates minimum performance stand-
ards and graduated hazard penalties. OSHA would oversee and adminis-
ter the various elements of the program. As with persons whose diseases
have already been caused, those receiving compensation from this plan
would still be able to bring products liability suits against firms, but the
level of such awards would be reduced by any disability compensation.
The first element of the proposal is grounded in both equity and effi-
ciency. From an equity standpoint, victims of disease resulting from future
hazards deserve compensation from social security disability funds as
much as current disease victims do. Moreover, the social security option
would provide fair compensation without distorting incentives to reduce
workplace health risks.
The second element of the proposal would make market forces work
more effectively by providing workers and employers with better informa-
tion about hazardous substances. The information would be similar to
that mandated by the recently promulgated OSHA hazard communication
regulation."3 6 If workers are better informed about the health risks they
face, they can make more rational choices about risk assumption, protec-
tive equipment, compensation, and insurance.""7 Informed decisions will
in turn influence industry costs and procedures and thus will push risk
levels and production closer to efficient levels.
However, improving the amount of information available to workers
will not, by itself, solve the problem. Direct regulation still will be neces-
sary to control occupational risks. Specification standards"'3 -the predom-
inant method of OSHA regulation in the past-should be replaced by
minimum performance standards" 9 and graduated hazard penalties. 40
136. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200).
137. There is some evidence that increasing the amount of information about workplace hazards
will not necessarily lead to alterations in worker attitudes and behavior. See Adler & Pittle, Cajolery
or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, I YALE J. ON REG.
159, 165-70 (1984).
138. Specification standards are regulations requiring specific safety equipment (e.g., machine
guards, ventilators) to be installed. See Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 214.
139. Performance standards are regulations that require provision of certain healthful conditions
without requiring use of a specific technology. For example, the current regulation limiting airborne
asbestos concentrations to 0.5 asbestos fibers per cubic centimeter is a performance standard, allowing
the employer to achieve the standard "by any feasible combination of engineering controls, work prac-
tices, and personal protective equipment and devices." 48 Fed. Reg. 51086, 51139 (to be codified at 29
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Such performance standards and hazard penalties would be based on risk-
related characteristics of the workplace (e.g., concentrations of cotton dust
fibers in the air) or of the workers (e.g., lead levels in workers' blood)
which could be easily monitored. Performance standards are superior to
specification standards because they increase the employer's flexibility
without sacrificing workplace safety. Expansion of the employer's range of
options for protecting the health of his workers will improve the economic
efficiency of the resulting investment in workplace hazard reduction. Haz-
ard penalties allow the employer to avoid making unreasonably inefficient
investments in hazard reduction by instead paying penalties reflecting the
social cost of the foregone risk reduction. Hazard penalties should be con-
siderably larger than those currently assessed by OSHA for noncompli-
ance with regulatory standards in order to approximate the social cost of
occupational disease risk and thus create efficient incentives for health and
safety precautions.
The third element of my proposed policy is a risk regulation system
that combines performance standards and hazard penalties. Under this
proposal, all firms would be required to meet certain minimum health and
exposure standards. Beyond these minimum levels, however, further risk
reductions would be rewarded by diminishing hazard penalties. A firm
could comply with the strictest standards and pay no penalty, comply only
with the minimum standards and pay the full penalty, or choose an inter-
mediate level and pay the corresponding portion of the graduated penalty.
In essence, each employer would be free to determine the most efficient
means of compliance for his operation and, as long as the minimum stand-
ards were met, could choose not to improve workplace conditions when he
believes it would be unduly expensive to do so.
The proceeds from the penalty system could be used to provide addi-
tional resources for the compensation system. In the interest of efficiency,
however, the compensation element of this proposal should rely primarily
on the social security disability program, with funds generated through a
general payroll tax. In any event, the choice of the level of compensation
must be made independently of the level of resources generated through
hazard penalties; this will ensure equitable treatment of all disease victims
and avoid over- penalizing risky workplaces. Tying the risk reduction and
compensation objectives together too closely will only eliminate the flex-
ibility and freedom needed to accomplish both goals.
C.F.R. § 1910.1001(k)).
140. Hazard penalties are not a new idea. See generally Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of
Pollution, 19 PUB. INTEREST 69 (1970) (discussing the economics of an environmental tax); Nichols &
Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 228-30 (discussing the efficiency of a workplace injury tax).
Vol. 2: 53, 1984
Occupational Disease
Conclusion
Occupational disease presents a compelling public policy problem. It
affects the health and well-being of a substantial portion of this nation's
work force, as well as the vitality of important elements of the manufac-
turing sector. Both equity and efficiency must be considered in order to
address the problem effectively. Similarly situated victims of occupational
disease must be treated similarly, and acceptable minimum levels of com-
pensation must be established. At the same time, disease policies must be
designed to create efficient levels of health risks.
A coordinated approach should be adopted to accomplish these goals.
My proposal responds to the compensation and health risk issues with
separate, but coordinated, programs. Compensation should come largely
from social security disability funds, and performance standards and haz-
ard penalties should replace rigid command-and-control regulations.
Adoption of this proposal would cure the principal defect in the current
policies by ensuring that the funding mechanism for the compensation
program would not inefficiently distort the incentives produced by the risk
regulation program.
The strategy set forth in this article is not a cure-all; the problem is too
complex to be solved so simply. Nevertheless, the analysis provides a
framework for attacking the occupational disease problem in an efficient
and equitable manner.

